常常觉得小s能给我很多力量。
只是我要提防自己变得像她那样越来越跋扈。我这样一个本来就很尖酸刻薄的人！
在“漫长”的一周过后，抽了一个小时看了看新的康熙来了，好像人都整个儿的复苏过来了。
人在经受压力的过程中会变得很扭曲。有时候我觉得作为女生，抗压能力真的很差（当然我平素还是觉得多愁善感在大多数情况下是一种好处）。
压力大就容易崩溃，就容易迁怒，就容易吵架。我有一次还自言自语似的告诉自己，最近要克制了，不能再作妖了。
听说了两起分手事故。都挺让人不好受的。虽然地久天长不是这世界上顶重要的事情，但是想到那些未免会伤神的人还是有些挂心。
还有一些人开始了（或继续着）遥远的牵挂。好好的。好好的。
口语project 1跟一个物理的mm分在一组。也许这就是宿命吧。= =
昨晚打了通宵的牌。喝了两口百威。苦。还是喝MountainDew提神些。。。困了之后还是会做傻事说傻话。好在大家都是些很好的人。
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Saturday, August 2, 2008
留个底
Despite Flaws, Rights in China Have Expanded
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/02/world/asia/02china.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Despite%20Flaws,%20Rights%20in%20China%20Expand&st=cse&scp=1SHANGHAI — For the past two decades, China’s people became richer but not much freer, and the Communist Party has staked its future on their willingness to live with that tradeoff.
That, at least, is the conventional wisdom. But as the Olympic Games approach, training a spotlight on China’s rights record, that view obscures a more complex reality: political change, however gradual and inconsistent, has made China a significantly more open place for average people than it was a generation ago.
Much remains unfree here. The rights of public expression and assembly are sharply limited; minorities, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang Province, are repressed; and the party exercises a nearly complete monopoly on political decision making.
But Chinese people also increasingly live where they want to live. They travel abroad in ever larger numbers. Property rights have found broader support in the courts. Within well-defined limits, people also enjoy the fruits of the technological revolution, from cellphones to the Internet, and can communicate or find information with an ease that has few parallels in authoritarian countries of the past.
“Some people will tell you, look at the walls, and say they are still pretty high, while others will tell you that there is a lot of space between the walls,” said Nicholas Bequelin, a China specialist at Human Rights Watch. “Both things are true.”
Chinese who try to challenge the one-party state directly say authorities are no more tolerant of dissent than they were in the 1980s, and in some cases they are tougher on citizen-led campaigns to enforce legal rights or stop environmental abuses.
On the other hand, the definition of what constitutes a political challenge has changed. Individuals are far less likely to run afoul of a system that no longer demands conformity in political views or personal lifestyles.
The shift toward a more diverse society helps explain some anomalies in perceptions of life inside China. Amnesty International, the human rights group, reported this week that the rights situation had deteriorated significantly in the months before the Olympics despite China’s pledges to improve its record as a condition for hosting the games.
But a survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project this spring and issued last month found that an astounding 86 percent of Chinese said they were content with their country’s direction, double the percentage who said the same thing in 2002. Only 23 percent of Americans polled in the survey said they were satisfied with their country’s direction.
The speeches of China’s leaders, with their gray imagery and paternalistic phrasings, have changed relatively little, emphasizing unity, harmony and economic growth under party rule. The reality on the ground, though, has been transformed, partly because a more dynamic economy necessitates a more dynamic society, partly because money gives people options they did not have when they were poor.
Arguably the most dramatic change in the freedoms enjoyed by most Chinese has been the gradual erosion of a population registration system that tied people to their places of birth, preventing internal migration or, at its height, even tourism.
China has not formally abandoned the system, known as hukou, and it can still prove a nuisance. But as hundreds of millions of people have moved from the inland provinces to wealthier coastal cities in search of economic opportunity, authorities in one place after another have found themselves making concessions to this new reality.
Song Daqing, who lives in a single-room home here with his wife and three children, counts himself as a beneficiary of these changes. Born into poverty in Sichuan Province, he worked as a cattle herder, bricklayer and coal miner, earning as little as 60 cents a day before coming to Shanghai in 1998. His early years in this city were marked by frequent mass roundups of migrants by the police, and he was twice held in crowded detention centers before being expelled from the city.
“Now we all have residence permits,” said Mr. Song, who supports his family by selling vegetables. “The police don’t check our paperwork anymore, and even if they found you without a permit, they won’t arrest you, but rather would suggest you get one as soon as possible.”
Reality Trumps Ideology
The relative flexibility the government has shown in allowing this to happen is more a matter of pragmatism than any overt ideological shift, a grudging concession to economic reality.
“China’s economic development relies on the flow of migrants into cities,” said Wei Wei, the founder of Little Bird, an organization that runs a special phone line to help migrant workers protect their rights. “The country’s growth depends on it.”
Little Bird itself is an example of incremental openness. It is a nongovernmental organization, one of thousands addressing social, economic and environmental issues that the party once insisted it could handle by itself. The leeway private groups have to influence public policy is still limited. Those that cross unwritten lines into political opposition often are shut down.
But China’s bureaucracy is more contentious than it was under Mao. Policy advocates within the government — including officials representing weak bureaucracies, like those charged with fighting pollution, improving education and broadening women’s rights — often seek popular support to increase their clout.
A recent example involved a revision of a law covering rights for the handicapped, which the government undertook after several organizations banded together in 2004 to advocate change on the issue. The activists also contacted Chinese legislators and provided a report to the official Chinese Disabled Person’s Federation.
The government never publicly acknowledged the citizens’ action, but a revised law incorporating some of their recommendations was enacted earlier this year. “The pressure came from both inside and outside,” said Wu Runling, director of the Beijing Huitianyu Information Consulting Center, one of the groups involved. “You can’t tell me that our appeal and calls for revision of the law had no meaning at all.”
Although a powerful system of censorship remains a fact of life, and journalists are frequently jailed and detained, feisty publications with mass audiences in print and on the Internet report forthrightly about ills in society.
Greater access to information has emboldened people to assert some rights. Homeowners in cities like Shanghai and Chongqing have resisted government development schemes with some success, and the proliferation of petitioners with all kinds of grievances presents the authorities with an informal check on their power.
“After 30 years, everybody knows about democracy and freedom,” said Wang Xiaodong, a researcher at the China Youth Research Center, a wing of the Communist Youth League. “They know that as taxpayers, we support the government, not the opposite.”
Before the Olympics, Beijing demolished a favorite pilgrimage spot for petitioners who flow to the capital from all over the country to seek redress from perceived injustice. According to a recent report in a Hong Kong magazine, Phoenix Weekly, the government has also hired thugs to intimidate or kidnap petitioners to prevent them from making their cases. Critics of such abuses say that in an indirect way, the state is acknowledging the power of such protest.
“Human rights has become more than just a theory for the public,” said Jiang Qisheng, a student leader during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and former political prisoner. “In the past they petitioned and complained about injustice, but that wasn’t about defending their rights. They let the higher authorities to decide their rights.
“What they are asking for now is a change in the system, and this reflects a widespread change in attitude,” he said.
Even in the best of times, China’s human rights improvements have been so gradual as to be almost impossible to discern in any month-to-month sense. And in the tense environment before the Olympics, which China fears could invite uncontrollable protests or blemish its international image, the climate has become noticeably more restrictive.
Lawyers have been sternly warned not to represent clients involved in delicate political cases. Tibetans and Uighur Muslims have been subjected to arrests and “re-education” campaigns.
Hu Jia, a Beijing-based political activist who campaigned for years on behalf of AIDS patients and for greater political openness, was arrested late last year and sentenced to three and a half years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power.” Many other dissidents have been warned to stay away from Beijing, or have seen state surveillance and harassment extended to their family members.
The government relies on unwritten laws: political confrontation with the ruling party remains a no-go area, and state stability trumps nascent notions of human rights.
Blogs Subvert Propaganda
Yet even as the police tightened security before the Games, the power of new information technologies to chip away at the official line was still on display. In a poor county in Guizhou Province in the south, a teenage girl died under mysterious circumstances, and rumors of police malfeasance and a cover-up spread widely on the Internet, prompting public protests to demand a new investigation.
Local authorities initially tried to suppress news of the protests, which turned violent, and impose an official account of events there. But people wielding video cameras uploaded material to YouTube, and some Chinese journalists disputed official accounts that the riots had been put down peacefully.
One of them was Wu Hanpin, a radio reporter who took pictures of the riot. They showed that the police had fired rubber bullets and teenagers in detention whose bruised foreheads suggested beatings.
“I saw a gap between the official story and the reality, which was mind-blowing, like the presence of the armed police,” Mr. Wu said. “So I put some of these things on the Internet, on my personal blog.” Four days later, after registering hundreds of thousands of visitors, his blog was closed by censors.
“The media has made a huge step forward from the ’80s,” said Sun Jinping, a veteran senior editor at a Beijing newspaper. The riot in Guizhou Province, he said, “would have been impossible for the public to know about in the past.”
A View of the Outside
For others, the impact of information about other countries has been just as great. He Weifang, a professor of law at Peking University, said that before the economic reform era began in 1979, the country was much like North Korea, where people were indoctrinated to believe that Chinese were the better off than people anywhere else.
“Today, even the farmers in remote areas have satellite TVs,” Mr. He said. “So whenever they see an election, such as the one held in Pakistan recently, they may wonder why, even though we have approximately the same economic conditions, they can elect their top leaders, and we can’t even vote for the leader of a small county. I think a consciousness of political rights has increased more than anything.”
Even China’s party-run legal system is a fulcrum for experimentation, though in an ambiguous way that highlights the uncertainties in the country’s transition.
Judges do not have the power to rule independently in China. Yet the country now has 165,000 registered lawyers, a five-fold increase since 1990, and average people have hired them to press for enforcement of rights inscribed in the Chinese Constitution. The courts today sometimes defend property rights and business contracts even when powerful state interests are on the other side.
In criminal law, progress is more grudging. Yan Ruyu, a former Beijing police officer who quit the force and became a lawyer after the violent crackdown on protesters at Tiananmen Square, said such cases remained unpopular with most lawyers because the likelihood of prevailing over the state remains so slim.
“There has been progress, but it’s so slow that sometimes one becomes pessimistic,” he said. “It’s empty talk to speak of having an independent judiciary if the party leads everything.”
On the other hand, Mr. Yan says, party control turns every criminal case into a human rights case. That gives every criminal defense lawyer the chance — and for some of them, the incentive — to inch the system forward.
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Let future Marshall and future Ted figure it out.
馬英九就職演說 Part 1(20-5-08)
馬英九就職演說 Part 2(20-5-08)
馬英九就職演說 Part 3(20-5-08)
兩岸不論在台灣海峽或國際社會，都應該和解休兵，並在國際組織及活動中相互協助、彼此尊重 。兩岸人民同屬中華民族，本應各盡所能，齊頭並進，共同貢獻國際社會，而非惡性競爭、虛耗資源。我深信，以世界之大、中華民族智慧之高，台灣與大陸一定可以找到和平共榮之道。
馬英九就職演說 Part 2(20-5-08)
馬英九就職演說 Part 3(20-5-08)
兩岸不論在台灣海峽或國際社會，都應該和解休兵，並在國際組織及活動中相互協助、彼此尊重 。兩岸人民同屬中華民族，本應各盡所能，齊頭並進，共同貢獻國際社會，而非惡性競爭、虛耗資源。我深信，以世界之大、中華民族智慧之高，台灣與大陸一定可以找到和平共榮之道。
Monday, May 19, 2008
理解。
很多事没有经历就不会有理解。
刚刚看水木上天涯上不断有人抱怨因为有余震预报而不敢回家睡觉，说终于“有点理解政府不预报地震的理由了，的确容易引起恐慌”。
当然，有没有能力预报是另一件事。如果真的掌握一定情况，而无法做出发报决策，这种心态，没有经历过就不会理解。
大灾难从始至今都充斥着各种责难，不止预警问题受到了强烈的质疑，此后又有提到救援迟缓、救人不力，第一次在天涯（没有存该贴地址，不过这样的言论应该很容易找到）看到有人用极其恶毒的言辞咒骂官兵，指责他们为什么不第一时间派飞机派伞兵去震中时，我真的惊呆了，原句子大概是说：“如果主观上真想救人，就是下刀子也能跳下去！”
站在受灾群众的角度看也许是事实，有谭老师这样的人向我们证明生命能放出何等的光华；但是，看看那些兵们的娃娃脸，我真的说不出“就是拿十个兵换一个灾民的命也是值得的”这样的话。
看到一个不熟的学妹，写道她爷爷和爸爸都曾参加过唐山大地震的救援，当时也是不要命，可是她想起来是又后怕又心疼，她对于“养兵千日，就为了这一日为国捐躯”的论断充满了愤怒。
也许“军人”这个词对于多数人都显得遥远，所以无法切近的想象他们之痛。往往是身在灾区或原籍四川的人，反而跳出来说，四川那里地势有多险要，震后暴雨瓢泼、山体滑坡，直升机如何无法飞行，可军人们还是知不可为而为。不知道那158名被掩埋在泥石流中的兵哥哥的尸体（source：纽约时报158 Relief Workers in China Are Killed by Landslides，原文不明原因已被撤销）有没有终于让咒骂官兵的人住嘴。
后来说到国际援助的事，也是争论得不可开交。且不论“外援”是不是极其无用、是不是三十几国救援队伍在台湾921地震中只抢救出区区四个人，我恰好非常理解四川作为战略基地所不能敞开大门迎天下客的理由，由AOL、NYtimes等中国问题专员的评论看来，他们也很清楚四川有着中国的“核基地”，这种天下一小半人皆知的“秘密”是否足以让中国暂缓国际援助的介入呢？某些网民的回答是：“人命关天的时刻，谁还在乎什么国家安全？！”
对于这样的论调，我无法回应。在国家间利益冲突尚未消失的时代里，地球有没有我们想象的那么平？人的性命的确无法拿来讨价还价，“跟国家利益比起来，个人利益不值一提”也不是我支持的理念，大义与小爱之间的平衡总是那么难拎清。
近日来著名的汉阳小学不倒事件中，拯救了全校小朋友一个不落成功逃生的老师们解释为什么不原地等待救援时说：“我们理解县领导啊，他们还得救埋在下面的人，一时顾不到我们了，我们只能自己救自己。”这种理解让人心疼，也许他们没有责任如此“理解县领导”，他们本该安然的等待理所应当的救援。然而，对于四川这个人口近亿的大省，13万解放军能不能及时向每一个需要的人都伸出双手？
成都的“的哥”曾经感动中国，免费为灾区运送救灾物资、抢救灾民，然而很快就人说，一定是出租车公司摊派他们这样做。还有很多人focus了一件件“不容忽视的小事”，如有人倒在街头，没人伸出援手，如给政府一遍遍打电话呼救却无人理会。除了上段提到的救援队伍是不是千手观音的因素以外，我也很同情那些街头匆匆走过、不理会旁人的成都路人。经历一场大难后，虽然还有人讲成都人镇定，乐观，麻将牌是震不倒的，麻油碟也是震不翻的，但是他们真的一切如常吗？见证了生离死别之后，见证了massive shock之后，他们平静的外表下有没有一个需要抒解的心？心理学专家纷纷表示，灾区民众和他们相关的亲属都需要立刻、积极的心理干预，可是还是有人不以为然，对从灾难边缘脱险的青岛中能队要求推迟中超比赛的行为大加讽刺与鄙视。
大灾之后，有人说重新看到了爱，有人说人性光辉泯灭。这是由于不同的视角，也是由于不同的心态。对于灾难，有人是外放型反应，去哭，去喊，去帮助，去奔忙，有人是自闭型反应，去躲，去藏，去沉默，去逃避。无论哪一种，都应该得到适度的理解，理解人的承受能力，终究有一个限度。
多数人，多数人是承认中国政府在应对此次天灾中有了明显的进步，较以往相比，救援行动更迅速，政策更以人为本，信息更透明；但是认为政府做得不够好、甚至一点都不好的人仍为数不少。针对国内、国际批评，中国政府基本都采取了很快的回应，包括空投伞兵、允许外援介入、公开死亡人数、公布灾区需要，等等，但偌大国家，在这个手忙脚乱的当口，肯定有太多把柄落人口实，即使是远在灾区之外，也有小到广州惠州三中史上最无耻捐款的丑闻，大到红十字基金会能保证多少比例的捐款真正有效利用到灾区人民之手的争论。
欲加之罪何患无辞，更何况中国这片土地上从来就没有根除过种种恶习。有人说，这些丑恶行为的账也许不该都算在CCP头上，但至少他们有责任改革国内现状。我说，我归根结底还是一个乐观主义者，对于中国的未来我相信它终归一天的美好和强大。但这一条道路到底要走多久？我们离开放，民主，法治，言论自由，到底有多远？我想，我们还是需要有耐心。我不盼着中国立时完美，我只盼着中国时时前进。
我也担心，太过激进的言行，反而会引起现今进步方向的倒退。对于1989，看过youtube上的影像资料，看过高校ftp上秘密传播的录像，看过家中保存下来的大量报刊，对于事件前的言论开放程度，我很是惊讶，对比现在的南都、南方周末，有过之而无不及。所以，我一方面相信国内、国际的舆论压力会监督中国的成长，另一方面也忧虑过激的行为会导致生物应激性的反应。
对于愤青，往往很不能沉下气去理解这个国家中人民迥异的接受能力。某导演宣称，不能在中国拍太深刻的电影，因为观众看不懂；愤青们（包括很多并不“愤”的人）都大怒，觉得他在侮辱中国人民的智商。然而，我相信很多人的父辈都对《武林外传》毫无兴趣，甚至有着地域差距的观众群也会对《武》或者大爱或者持之以鼻；对于港台闹剧日剧韩剧的审美差异就更加明显；对于台湾议会推推搡搡脱鞋丢人的“娱乐式”政治，有多少人笑话其为小丑跳梁？我不觉得当下这个中国已经全民准备好了拥抱民主，即使对于最积极亢进的那一批人而言，我也斗胆断言他们未必真的理解民主内涵，只是沉醉于这个动听的迷梦。
这篇文章，我尽量提供援引的source，以免我的解读影响了读者对原文的理解。可惜还有太多“惊为天人”的言论，我在惊诧之后并没有马上记录在案，现在也无法提供给大家看看这天下滑之大稽的人无处不在。我最近看到的一个“惊爆评论”是揭秘武警在灾情72小时内无行动的内幕（这句所指就并不确实），说是PLA早就有意起义反抗当今领导层，而总理的“你们看着办”更是惹恼了各员大将，不出一月PLA就会倒戈反共。这样的“揭秘”真是解了我这全国哀悼三日无娱乐新闻可看的渴，可即使这样的论调也有人认可有人当真，把这“大揭秘”当真的人写的博客，也还是有人当真。
即使如此，我还是应该理解。理解。对于一些人而言，言论自由，在他们看来就是如此，不仅可以公开事实，也可以造谣生非。在他们的世界里，人人都该对他负责任，偏偏他不需要对任何人负责任。
至于，民主是不是一剂万能药，美国的言论自由是如何被用来随意解读以保障国家利益，我无力深谈。无论如何，我相信对于中国而言，民主改革是一条漫长的必由之路，虽然这之前之后都仍然会有痛苦。
至于，独立思考是不是就是网特脑残，我没有兴趣。我只在乎人们是不是能渐渐彼此理解，在一个正义的基础上求同存异，不盲信，不盲从，不信谣，不传谣。
文章是昨天写了开头，不想发表了。后来醒悟，就胡言乱语了，又如何呢？写得毫无章法，毫无逻辑，也请大家理解。
理解。
刚刚看水木上天涯上不断有人抱怨因为有余震预报而不敢回家睡觉，说终于“有点理解政府不预报地震的理由了，的确容易引起恐慌”。
当然，有没有能力预报是另一件事。如果真的掌握一定情况，而无法做出发报决策，这种心态，没有经历过就不会理解。
大灾难从始至今都充斥着各种责难，不止预警问题受到了强烈的质疑，此后又有提到救援迟缓、救人不力，第一次在天涯（没有存该贴地址，不过这样的言论应该很容易找到）看到有人用极其恶毒的言辞咒骂官兵，指责他们为什么不第一时间派飞机派伞兵去震中时，我真的惊呆了，原句子大概是说：“如果主观上真想救人，就是下刀子也能跳下去！”
站在受灾群众的角度看也许是事实，有谭老师这样的人向我们证明生命能放出何等的光华；但是，看看那些兵们的娃娃脸，我真的说不出“就是拿十个兵换一个灾民的命也是值得的”这样的话。
看到一个不熟的学妹，写道她爷爷和爸爸都曾参加过唐山大地震的救援，当时也是不要命，可是她想起来是又后怕又心疼，她对于“养兵千日，就为了这一日为国捐躯”的论断充满了愤怒。
也许“军人”这个词对于多数人都显得遥远，所以无法切近的想象他们之痛。往往是身在灾区或原籍四川的人，反而跳出来说，四川那里地势有多险要，震后暴雨瓢泼、山体滑坡，直升机如何无法飞行，可军人们还是知不可为而为。不知道那158名被掩埋在泥石流中的兵哥哥的尸体（source：纽约时报158 Relief Workers in China Are Killed by Landslides，原文不明原因已被撤销）有没有终于让咒骂官兵的人住嘴。
后来说到国际援助的事，也是争论得不可开交。且不论“外援”是不是极其无用、是不是三十几国救援队伍在台湾921地震中只抢救出区区四个人，我恰好非常理解四川作为战略基地所不能敞开大门迎天下客的理由，由AOL、NYtimes等中国问题专员的评论看来，他们也很清楚四川有着中国的“核基地”，这种天下一小半人皆知的“秘密”是否足以让中国暂缓国际援助的介入呢？某些网民的回答是：“人命关天的时刻，谁还在乎什么国家安全？！”
对于这样的论调，我无法回应。在国家间利益冲突尚未消失的时代里，地球有没有我们想象的那么平？人的性命的确无法拿来讨价还价，“跟国家利益比起来，个人利益不值一提”也不是我支持的理念，大义与小爱之间的平衡总是那么难拎清。
近日来著名的汉阳小学不倒事件中，拯救了全校小朋友一个不落成功逃生的老师们解释为什么不原地等待救援时说：“我们理解县领导啊，他们还得救埋在下面的人，一时顾不到我们了，我们只能自己救自己。”这种理解让人心疼，也许他们没有责任如此“理解县领导”，他们本该安然的等待理所应当的救援。然而，对于四川这个人口近亿的大省，13万解放军能不能及时向每一个需要的人都伸出双手？
成都的“的哥”曾经感动中国，免费为灾区运送救灾物资、抢救灾民，然而很快就人说，一定是出租车公司摊派他们这样做。还有很多人focus了一件件“不容忽视的小事”，如有人倒在街头，没人伸出援手，如给政府一遍遍打电话呼救却无人理会。除了上段提到的救援队伍是不是千手观音的因素以外，我也很同情那些街头匆匆走过、不理会旁人的成都路人。经历一场大难后，虽然还有人讲成都人镇定，乐观，麻将牌是震不倒的，麻油碟也是震不翻的，但是他们真的一切如常吗？见证了生离死别之后，见证了massive shock之后，他们平静的外表下有没有一个需要抒解的心？心理学专家纷纷表示，灾区民众和他们相关的亲属都需要立刻、积极的心理干预，可是还是有人不以为然，对从灾难边缘脱险的青岛中能队要求推迟中超比赛的行为大加讽刺与鄙视。
大灾之后，有人说重新看到了爱，有人说人性光辉泯灭。这是由于不同的视角，也是由于不同的心态。对于灾难，有人是外放型反应，去哭，去喊，去帮助，去奔忙，有人是自闭型反应，去躲，去藏，去沉默，去逃避。无论哪一种，都应该得到适度的理解，理解人的承受能力，终究有一个限度。
多数人，多数人是承认中国政府在应对此次天灾中有了明显的进步，较以往相比，救援行动更迅速，政策更以人为本，信息更透明；但是认为政府做得不够好、甚至一点都不好的人仍为数不少。针对国内、国际批评，中国政府基本都采取了很快的回应，包括空投伞兵、允许外援介入、公开死亡人数、公布灾区需要，等等，但偌大国家，在这个手忙脚乱的当口，肯定有太多把柄落人口实，即使是远在灾区之外，也有小到广州惠州三中史上最无耻捐款的丑闻，大到红十字基金会能保证多少比例的捐款真正有效利用到灾区人民之手的争论。
欲加之罪何患无辞，更何况中国这片土地上从来就没有根除过种种恶习。有人说，这些丑恶行为的账也许不该都算在CCP头上，但至少他们有责任改革国内现状。我说，我归根结底还是一个乐观主义者，对于中国的未来我相信它终归一天的美好和强大。但这一条道路到底要走多久？我们离开放，民主，法治，言论自由，到底有多远？我想，我们还是需要有耐心。我不盼着中国立时完美，我只盼着中国时时前进。
我也担心，太过激进的言行，反而会引起现今进步方向的倒退。对于1989，看过youtube上的影像资料，看过高校ftp上秘密传播的录像，看过家中保存下来的大量报刊，对于事件前的言论开放程度，我很是惊讶，对比现在的南都、南方周末，有过之而无不及。所以，我一方面相信国内、国际的舆论压力会监督中国的成长，另一方面也忧虑过激的行为会导致生物应激性的反应。
对于愤青，往往很不能沉下气去理解这个国家中人民迥异的接受能力。某导演宣称，不能在中国拍太深刻的电影，因为观众看不懂；愤青们（包括很多并不“愤”的人）都大怒，觉得他在侮辱中国人民的智商。然而，我相信很多人的父辈都对《武林外传》毫无兴趣，甚至有着地域差距的观众群也会对《武》或者大爱或者持之以鼻；对于港台闹剧日剧韩剧的审美差异就更加明显；对于台湾议会推推搡搡脱鞋丢人的“娱乐式”政治，有多少人笑话其为小丑跳梁？我不觉得当下这个中国已经全民准备好了拥抱民主，即使对于最积极亢进的那一批人而言，我也斗胆断言他们未必真的理解民主内涵，只是沉醉于这个动听的迷梦。
这篇文章，我尽量提供援引的source，以免我的解读影响了读者对原文的理解。可惜还有太多“惊为天人”的言论，我在惊诧之后并没有马上记录在案，现在也无法提供给大家看看这天下滑之大稽的人无处不在。我最近看到的一个“惊爆评论”是揭秘武警在灾情72小时内无行动的内幕（这句所指就并不确实），说是PLA早就有意起义反抗当今领导层，而总理的“你们看着办”更是惹恼了各员大将，不出一月PLA就会倒戈反共。这样的“揭秘”真是解了我这全国哀悼三日无娱乐新闻可看的渴，可即使这样的论调也有人认可有人当真，把这“大揭秘”当真的人写的博客，也还是有人当真。
即使如此，我还是应该理解。理解。对于一些人而言，言论自由，在他们看来就是如此，不仅可以公开事实，也可以造谣生非。在他们的世界里，人人都该对他负责任，偏偏他不需要对任何人负责任。
至于，民主是不是一剂万能药，美国的言论自由是如何被用来随意解读以保障国家利益，我无力深谈。无论如何，我相信对于中国而言，民主改革是一条漫长的必由之路，虽然这之前之后都仍然会有痛苦。
至于，独立思考是不是就是网特脑残，我没有兴趣。我只在乎人们是不是能渐渐彼此理解，在一个正义的基础上求同存异，不盲信，不盲从，不信谣，不传谣。
文章是昨天写了开头，不想发表了。后来醒悟，就胡言乱语了，又如何呢？写得毫无章法，毫无逻辑，也请大家理解。
理解。
Thursday, May 15, 2008
“做人不能太纽约时报？”
自12日以来，西媒第一次谈到了“中国政府瞒报灾情？”这个话题，纽约时报发话：Superstition Meets the Web, Stinging Chinese Authorities（中国网络迷信横行，中国政府心恨难忍。。。诶我翻译得还真差。。。）
西媒终于对中国well-educated人群失去了信心：前段时间保卫火炬，他们就大摇起头，怎么会是些高知在为“毫无民主”的“极权政府”东奔西走；这会儿汶川地震，他们再次抚膺长叹，怎么大学毕业了还信蛤蟆搬家地震云？
也许多数吵得正欢的中国大学生愤青s对纽约时报的时评是看不到的，估计看到了也不会当回事，因为“西方媒体”自anti-CNN狂潮之后已经被搞臭了，这会儿骂大学生们迷信？大不了再建个anti-NYTimes，喊句“做人不能太纽约时报”。
唐山旧事重提，根本不令人意外；但是看到所谓中国排名前两名的高校的理工科学生还在为了“蛤蟆”的事儿纠缠不休，我多少有点崩溃。但我不敢太多回复，更不想极力驳斥。是不是我现在其实在这些人眼中已经变成了极端不正义？
我承认自己人格有些分裂，一方面，极端渴望理解和包容中国现在社会的形态和问题，另一方面，还做不到容忍和接受这些形态的极度扭曲与问题的极度恶化。
西媒终于对中国well-educated人群失去了信心：前段时间保卫火炬，他们就大摇起头，怎么会是些高知在为“毫无民主”的“极权政府”东奔西走；这会儿汶川地震，他们再次抚膺长叹，怎么大学毕业了还信蛤蟆搬家地震云？
也许多数吵得正欢的中国大学生愤青s对纽约时报的时评是看不到的，估计看到了也不会当回事，因为“西方媒体”自anti-CNN狂潮之后已经被搞臭了，这会儿骂大学生们迷信？大不了再建个anti-NYTimes，喊句“做人不能太纽约时报”。
唐山旧事重提，根本不令人意外；但是看到所谓中国排名前两名的高校的理工科学生还在为了“蛤蟆”的事儿纠缠不休，我多少有点崩溃。但我不敢太多回复，更不想极力驳斥。是不是我现在其实在这些人眼中已经变成了极端不正义？
我承认自己人格有些分裂，一方面，极端渴望理解和包容中国现在社会的形态和问题，另一方面，还做不到容忍和接受这些形态的极度扭曲与问题的极度恶化。
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
证据。
一个人笃信之事，通常而言，并不需要什么确切的证据。选择性失明，选择性谛听，对此也许没有良方。
或，这个emotional的时刻，要求人理性，是太残忍了些。也许发泄，是一种生存方式。
发现两丛丁香，对于我，是意义非凡的喜悦。
或，这个emotional的时刻，要求人理性，是太残忍了些。也许发泄，是一种生存方式。
发现两丛丁香，对于我，是意义非凡的喜悦。
Monday, May 12, 2008
预报。
虽然“灾情预报”这件事已经跟我没关系了，但是作为本科是大气科学专业毕业的学生，遇到极端天气状况，还是忍不住会关注一番。
今年中国经历了一系列的气候、地质考验，相应的，我可以想象一系列从事相关工作的人也经历了一场严峻考验。
尤其是在当下，在民众十分相信“科技的力量”的当下，灾害的可预报性可能已经被高估。因此，灾后的阵痛转嫁为对“失职者”的抨击，恐怕难以避免。CCTV的“逼问”，民间流传的“黑幕”，在每一次灾情之后，都会似曾相识的重演。
事 实上，最尴尬事，并非“全然无知”，更不可能是“全知全晓”，而是“一知半解”。有灾没报，一定会被迁怒；而错报灾情，一样会带来抽象的民心恐慌和实际的 经济损失，可能民众们事后就遗忘了，但预报人员不会忘记自己承受的压力。“准确预警”这件事，现在恐怕还停留在一个模糊的概率，从预测到播报，这个决定永 远是最难逾越的阻障。预报“降水概率是百分之几”这种让民众自己去决定要不要带伞的方式，绝对无法推广到“地震概率是百分之几”，前者不过是笑谈，后者就 是拿人命当儿戏。
解决这种矛盾的唯一途径，恐怕只有通过提高预报准确度的方式，只有从原理、技术、设备、人员各个方面都有了切实的提升，才可能停止“一知半解”的尴尬。
但是，人类究竟能有多了解自然界？真的有这样一天，我们能够达到全知吗？对此我并不报积极乐观的态度。
我只知道，在这样一天到来之前，灾情预报工作者必须忍受着来自管理层的压力和民间的指责，而不可能奢望得到宽容与谅解。
今年中国经历了一系列的气候、地质考验，相应的，我可以想象一系列从事相关工作的人也经历了一场严峻考验。
尤其是在当下，在民众十分相信“科技的力量”的当下，灾害的可预报性可能已经被高估。因此，灾后的阵痛转嫁为对“失职者”的抨击，恐怕难以避免。CCTV的“逼问”，民间流传的“黑幕”，在每一次灾情之后，都会似曾相识的重演。
事 实上，最尴尬事，并非“全然无知”，更不可能是“全知全晓”，而是“一知半解”。有灾没报，一定会被迁怒；而错报灾情，一样会带来抽象的民心恐慌和实际的 经济损失，可能民众们事后就遗忘了，但预报人员不会忘记自己承受的压力。“准确预警”这件事，现在恐怕还停留在一个模糊的概率，从预测到播报，这个决定永 远是最难逾越的阻障。预报“降水概率是百分之几”这种让民众自己去决定要不要带伞的方式，绝对无法推广到“地震概率是百分之几”，前者不过是笑谈，后者就 是拿人命当儿戏。
解决这种矛盾的唯一途径，恐怕只有通过提高预报准确度的方式，只有从原理、技术、设备、人员各个方面都有了切实的提升，才可能停止“一知半解”的尴尬。
但是，人类究竟能有多了解自然界？真的有这样一天，我们能够达到全知吗？对此我并不报积极乐观的态度。
我只知道，在这样一天到来之前，灾情预报工作者必须忍受着来自管理层的压力和民间的指责，而不可能奢望得到宽容与谅解。
Thursday, May 8, 2008
意义。
周二的时候收到小米的邮件。关于Graham奖学金。
非常羞惭。这一系列的获得都如此不真实。
最初就一直生活在没底和渴望之间。
如今我得到的已经超越了我以为能够得到的。
虽然只是1k。
但是谁能够懂得它之于我的意义？
尤其是在这么多年以后。
尤其是在这么多年以前。
谢谢陪我走过这么多年并陪我走向未来的人。
非常羞惭。这一系列的获得都如此不真实。
最初就一直生活在没底和渴望之间。
如今我得到的已经超越了我以为能够得到的。
虽然只是1k。
但是谁能够懂得它之于我的意义？
尤其是在这么多年以后。
尤其是在这么多年以前。
谢谢陪我走过这么多年并陪我走向未来的人。
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